Performance Incentives Within Firms : The Effect of Managerial Responsibility  

Oleh:

Aggarwal, Rajesh K. ; Samwick, Andrew A.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Finance (EBSCO) vol. 58 no. 4 (2003), page 1613-1650.
Topik: incentives; pay for performance; executive compensation; incentives; studies; stock prices; mathematical models
Fulltext: p 1613.pdf (281.81KB)

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ88 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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We show that top management incentives vary by responsibility. For oversight executives, pay - performance incentives are $1.22 per thousand dollar increase in shareholder wealth higher than for divisional executives. For CEOs, incentives are $5.65 higher than for divisional executives. Incentives for the median top management team are substantial at $32.32. CEOs account for 42 to 58 percent of aggregate team incentives. For divisional executives, the pay - divisional performance and the pay - firm performance sensitivity is decreasing in the precision of divisional performance. These results support principal-agent models with multiple signals of managerial effort.

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