Managerial Opportunism ? Evidence From Directors' and Officers' Insurance Purchases  

Oleh:

Harford, Jarrad ; Dann, Larry Y. ; Chalmers, John M. R.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Finance (EBSCO) vol. 57 no. 2 (2002), page 609-636.
Topik: EVIDENCE; studies; directors & officers insurance; insurance coverage; initial public offerings; disclosure; risk management; stock prices
Fulltext: p 609.pdf (126.55KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ88.5 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

Lihat Detail Induk

Isi artikel

We analyze a sample of 72 IPO firms that went public between 1992 and 1996 for which we have detailed proprietary information about the amount and cost of D & O liability insurance. If managers of IPO firms are exploiting superior inside information, we hypothesis that the amount of insurance coverage chosen will be related to the post - offering performance of the issuing firm's shares. Consistent with the hypothesis, we find a significant negartive relation between the three - year post IPO stock price performance and the insurance coverage purchased in conjuction with the IPO. One plausible interpretation is that, like insider securities transactions, D & O insurance decisions reveal opportunistic behaviour by managers. This provides some motivation to argue that disclosure of the details of D & O insurance decisions, as is required in some other countries, is valuable.

Opini Anda

Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini!

Kembali