Agency Costs And Ownership Structure  

Oleh:

Lin, James Wuh ; Cole, Rebbel A. ; Ang, James S.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Finance (EBSCO) vol. 55 no. 1 (2000), page 81-106.
Topik: agency costs; agency theory; ownership; small business; costs; many industries; statistical analysis; studies
Fulltext: p 81.pdf (202.19KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ88.1 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

We provide measures of absolute and relative equity agency costs for corporations under different ownership and management structures. Our base case is jensen and meckling's (1976) zero agency - cost firm, where the manager is the firm's sole shareholder. We utilize a sample of 1,708 small corporations from the FRB / NSSBF database and find that agency costs : i. are significantly higher when an outsider rather than an insider manages the firm ii. are inversely related to the manager's ownership share iii. increase with the number of non manager shareholders, and iv. to a lesser extent, are lower with greater monitoring by banks

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