Two-Level Eudaimonism and Second-Personal Reasons  

Oleh:

Cokelet, Bradford

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 122 no. 4 (Jul. 2012), page 773-780.
Topik: Eudaimonism; Nonderivative Normative authority; Second-Personal Reasons

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.30 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

In “Virtue Ethics and Deontic Constraints,” Mark LeBar claims to have discovered a two-level eudaimonist position that coheres with the claim that moral obligations are “real” and have “nonderivative normative authority.” In this article, I raise worries about how “real” second-personal reasons are on LeBar’s account, and then argue that second-personal reasons ramify up from the first to the second level in a way that LeBar denies. My argument is meant to encourage philosophers in the Aristotelian tradition to question the existence of second-personal reasons of the sort Darwall elucidates.

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