Why Do Bidder CEOs Get Disciplined Following Mergers?  

Oleh:

Soegiharto

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional - terdaftar di DIKTI
Dalam koleksi: The Indonesian Journal of Accounting Research (Jurnal Riset Akuntansi Indonesia) vol. 15 no. 1 (Jan. 2012), page 21-50.
Topik: CEO turnover; CEO Overconfidence; Merger Waves; Method of Payment; Merger Premium; Operating Performance.

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR17.10 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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This study examines the effect of CEOs' behavior (overconfidence/ less overconfidence), merger period (in-wave/non-wave), method of payment (stock/cash), industry of merged firm (across-industry/ within-industry), premium paid to target firm, and operating performance on the likelihood of a CEO turnover amongst bidding firms. Testing the US successful merger and acquisition data for the period of the 1990s, this study finds that the effect of merger waves and the method of payment on CEO turnover are positive and significant. Three measures of CEO behavior proposed and tested in this study, however, generally have insignificant effect on CEO turnover.

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