Philosophical integrations  

Oleh:

Goldstein, Laurence

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Language Sciences (Full Text) vol. 26 no. 6 (2004), page 545-563.
Topik: Computationalism; Davidson; Harris; Integrationism; Malapropism; Wittgenstein
Fulltext: Goldstein_Laurence, p. 545-563.pdf (255.55KB)

Isi artikel

Our understanding of malapropism is a phenomenon that cries out for explanation, and we here use this phenomenon as a test case to evaluate the plausibility not just of different versions of Integrationism but also of the
Language of Thought hypothesis and a rival Dynamical Systems approach to modelling the workings of the mind. The verdict: The Roy Harris version of Integrationism (which overlaps interestingly with some views of the philosopher Donald Davidson) is extravagant and implausible and does not cut the mustard. The
Language of Thought hypothesis is put under severe strain. The Dynamical Systems approach which incorporates the
Extended Mind hypothesis, sits comfortably with the plausible version of Integrationism that is found in the late writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein.

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