In Defense of Objectivism about Moral Obligation  

Oleh:

Graham, Peter A.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 121 no. 1 (Oct. 2010), page 88-115.
Topik: Normative Ethics; Moral Obligations; Beliefs; Subjectivists

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.31 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

There is a debate in normative ethics about whether or not our moral obligations depend solely on either our evidence concerning, or our beliefs about, the world. Subjectivists maintain that they do and objectivists maintain that they do not. I shall offer some arguments in support of objectivism and respond to the strongest argument for subjectivism. I shall also briefly consider the significance of my discussion to the debate over whether one's future voluntary actions are relevant to one's current moral obligations.

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