Insider Shareholding, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance  

Oleh:

Chou, Te-Kuang ; Ko, Pei-Chun ; Chen, Yi-Hsiu

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah nasional - tidak terakreditasi DIKTI - atma jaya
Dalam koleksi: TRANSAKSI : Jurnal Bisnis, Ekonomi, dan Sosial vol. 3 no. 01 (Aug. 2011), page 2-19.
Topik: Corporate Governance; Ownership Structure; Agency Theory
Fulltext: Te-Kuang Chou; Pei-Chun Ko; Yi-Hsiu Chen - Bernard.pdf (10.64MB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: TT40.1 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

According to Taiwanese Securities and Exchange Law, in a public company, the board director and supervisors as a whole must own at least a specified percentage of its outstanding shares. The purpose of this legal requirement is obviously linked to corporate governance. This paper aims to evaluate the effectiveness of Taiwan's minimum shareholding requirement. The result shows an overall positive relationship between the shareholding of controlling insiders and the level of corporate governance, implying the legal requirement in concern do has it's root on business reality, though the significance of relationship differs among groups defined with company's scale, development stage and industrial sector. Based on these findings, we suggest that a more delicate review of minimum shareholding requirements is needed to improve its effectiveness. For the emerging markets, Taiwan's minimum shareholding requirement could be referred as a policy option to strengthen its corporate governance mechanism, especially at its developing stage of financial market.

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