Detail Capital Mobility and Environmental Standards : Racing to The Bottom With Multiple Tax Instruments   Oleh:  Jinyoung, Kim ; Wilson, John Douglas Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: JAPAN AND THE WORLD ECONOMY vol. 9 no. 4 (1997), page 537-552. Topik: capital; capability mobility; environmental; multiple tax instruments Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ47.7 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel This paper investigates the possibility of a 'race to the bottom,’ under which intergovernmental competition for mobile capital leads to inefficiently lax environmental standards. A model is constructed in which independent welfare - maximizing governments regulate pollution emissions from production activities, while taxing residential labor and mobile capital to finance public good expenditures. A race is shown to exist in the sense that a 'central planner’ could improve welfare in every country by requiring that each government tighten its environmental standards. The analysis also shows that the tax - financed public good is underprovided in equilibrium, but it is argued that this problem may be less severe than the race - to - the - bottom problem. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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