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Detail
ArtikelRepeated Contract Negotiations With Private Information  
Oleh: Kennan, John
Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine
Dalam koleksi: JAPAN AND THE WORLD ECONOMY vol. 7 no. 4 (1995), page 447-472.
Topik: negotiations; contract negotiations; private information
Ketersediaan
  • Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi)
    • Nomor Panggil: JJ47.5
    • Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0)
    • Tandon: tidak ada
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Isi artikelLabor contracts are repeated, and the current negotiation apparently affects negotiations on the next contract. There is evidence that the likelihood of a strike is influenced by what happened before the previous contract was signed. To analyze whether private information might explain this, a model of negotiations between a buyer and a seller is developed where the "pie” in each contract follows a Markov chain, with transitions observed privately by the buyer. Each negotiation is a sequence of offers by the seller ; the buyer can only accept or reject each offer, and a contract is signed when the buyer accepts.
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