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Repeated Contract Negotiations With Private Information
Oleh:
Kennan, John
Jenis:
Article from Bulletin/Magazine
Dalam koleksi:
JAPAN AND THE WORLD ECONOMY vol. 7 no. 4 (1995)
,
page 447-472.
Topik:
negotiations
;
contract negotiations
;
private information
Ketersediaan
Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi)
Nomor Panggil:
JJ47.5
Non-tandon:
1 (dapat dipinjam: 0)
Tandon:
tidak ada
Lihat Detail Induk
Isi artikel
Labor contracts are repeated, and the current negotiation apparently affects negotiations on the next contract. There is evidence that the likelihood of a strike is influenced by what happened before the previous contract was signed. To analyze whether private information might explain this, a model of negotiations between a buyer and a seller is developed where the "pie” in each contract follows a Markov chain, with transitions observed privately by the buyer. Each negotiation is a sequence of offers by the seller ; the buyer can only accept or reject each offer, and a contract is signed when the buyer accepts.
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