Review Article: Propositions, Attitudes, and Russellian Annotations  

Oleh:

Falkenberg, Gabriel

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Journal of Semantics (Sebagian Full Text) vol. 11 no. 1-2 (Dec. 1994), page 133-148.
Topik: Propositional Attitudes; Russellian Annotations
Fulltext: vol 11, no 1-2 p 133-148.pdf (839.63KB)

Isi artikel

Richard's Propositional Attitudes contains a novel theory of belief-sentences in the Russellian tradition of'direct reference'. It distances itself critically from model-theoretic approaches, the tradition of Fregean sense theory, and also from more psychologically orientated semantics. The theory can be described as a compromise between a referential and a linguistic view of propositions, taken to be fine-grained as in a Structured-Intensions approach. The way terms in a f/iat-clause represent the 'how' of someone's belief are seen as determined by speakers' intentions, this being made explicit by stating restrictions on possible translations of those terms into different contexts. Propositions are formally reconstructed as Russellian annotated matrixes (RAMs), i.e. sequences of pairs consisting of sentential constituents and their respective Russellian interpretations. For a propositional attitude ascription to be true, the RAM of the ascriber's that- clause has to match, in accordance with the contextual restrictions in force, one of the RAMs in the ascribee's belief system. The theory is criticized on several counts, most importantly as being incomplete in not sufficiently spelling out how to get to the believer's RAM. Further, it is argued that—due to their hybrid nature—RAMs can hardly be taken as explaining the notion of a f/iaf-clause's content.

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