Behavioral explanations and intentional explanations in psychology  

Oleh:

Baum, William M. ; Heath, Jennifer L.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: American Psychologist vol. 47 no. 11 (Nov. 1992), page 1312-1317.

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan PKPM Nomor Panggil: A88 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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A recent criticism of behaviorism asserts that intentional explanations in psychology are acceptable and preferable to behavioral explanations. The philosopher Dennett justifies intentional explanations on the grounds that they are provisional and can be cashed out in principle. Skinner objected to such explanations on the grounds that they are never cashed out in practice. Their different views arise from their divergent goals for psychology understanding intelligence arid rationality versus understanding behavior. In the context of a science of behavior, intentional explanations only give the semblance of explanation because they rely on immediate causes that are functional. Nonintentional explanations acceptable for a science of behavior are historically, much as in evolutionary biology. When Dennett's argument is applied to evolutionary biology, it becomes a justification of creationism.

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