Radical behaviorism and scientific frameworks: from mechanistic to relational accounts  

Oleh:

Chiesa, Mecca

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: American Psychologist vol. 47 no. 11 (Nov. 1992), page 1287-1299.

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan PKPM Nomor Panggil: A88 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

Lihat Detail Induk

Isi artikel

A substantial portion of B. F Skinner's scholarship was devoted to developing methods and terms for a scientific study of behavior. Three concepts central to scientific accounts-cause, explanation. and theory-are examined to illustrate the distinction between mechanistic and relational frameworks and radical behaviorism's relationship to those frameworks. Informed by a scientific tradition that explicitly rejects mechanistic interpretations, radical behaviorism provides a distinctive stance in contemporary psychology. The present analysis suggests that radical behaviorism makes closer contact with the "new world view" advocated by physicists and philosophers of science than does much of contemporary psychology.

Opini Anda

Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini!

Kembali