The Nature of Discipline By Corporate Takeovers  

Oleh:

Kini, Omesh ; Kracaw, William A. ; Mian, Shehzad

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Finance (EBSCO) vol. 59 no. 4 (Aug. 2004), page 1511-1552.
Topik: disciplines; acquisitions & mergers; studies; control systems; corporate governance; correlation analysis
Fulltext: p 1511.pdf (191.39KB)

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ88 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

This paper provides a comprehensive examination of the disciplinary role of the corporate takeover market using a sample of US target firms over the period 1979 to 1998. The time period spanned allows for a broader study not only of the disciplinary role of the takeover market in general, but also of the interaction between the takeover market and alternative governance mechanisms during the 1980s and 1990s. Overall, our evidence is consistent with the view of the corporate takeover market as a "court of last resort," that is, it is an external source of discipline that intercedes when internal control mechanisms are relatively weak or ineffective.

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