Explanation and Color-Naming Research.  

Oleh:

Dedrick, Don

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Cross-Cultural Research vol. 39 no. 2 (May 2005), page 111.
Topik: color-naming theory; philosophy of science; actual sequence explanations; robust process explanations
Fulltext: 111.pdf (137.57KB)

Isi artikel

Perhaps one of the central assumptions when one comes to think about scientific explanations—an assumption made by philosophers and scientists alike—is that a causal explanation is an optimal explanation. It seems, after all, that an explanation tells us why something happens and that to do so is to specify causes. Although there is nothing wrong with causal explanations per se, many good explanations in science are not in any important sense causal. What I mean by this is that many good explanations in science are compatible with a variety of causal mechanisms and, as such, ignore the details of such mechanisms. I develop this claim in the discussion of color-naming research that follows, where I distinguish between explanation types that are (more) close to causality (actual sequence explanations) and those that are (more) removed from causal details (robust process explanations).

Opini Anda

Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini!

Kembali