Antitakeover Provisions and Shareholder Value Implications: A Review and a Contingency Framework  

Oleh:

Sundaramurthy, Chamu

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: JOM: Journal of Management vol. 26 no. 5 (2000), page 1005–1030.
Fulltext: 1005.pdf (126.92KB)

Isi artikel

This paper reviews literatures on the two competing theoretical views of the antitakeover provisions–shareholder value relationship — managerial entrenchment and shareholder interests — and offers a contingency framework to reconcile these views. This framework, based on a broader agency theory perspective and the organizational literatures on power, incorporates two key moderators: corporate board and shareholder monitoring, and draws attention to when rather than on whether antitakeover provisions enhance or erode shareholder value.

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