Testing A Model of Reasoned Risk - Taking : Governance, The Experience of Principals and Agents, and Global Strategy in High - Technology IPO Firms  

Oleh:

Carpenter, Mason A. ; Pollock, Timothy G. ; Leary, Myleen M.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Strategic Management Journal vol. 24 no. 9 (2003), page 803-820.
Topik: GOVERNANCE; corporate governance; top management teams; inetrnational strategy; international entrepreneurship

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: SS30.12 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

Lihat Detail Induk

Isi artikel

Research on the governance of risky ventures, the initial public offerings (IPOs) of high - technology firms, has focused primarily on the relationship between governance mechanisms and firm performance. While such an emphasis is clearly important, it does little to shed light on potential relationship between governance and the strategies pursued by risky firms nor does it take into account the complementary role of key stakeholders in affecting those strategies. To partially remedy this deficit we integrate agency and behavioural perspectives to develop a theory of "resasoned risk - taking", whereby the nature of risks undertaken is a consequence of the interaction of governance mechanisms and stakeholder characteristics. We demonstrate our theory by predicting when corporate governance should be associated with strategic risk - seeking beyond a firm's ethnical core as seen in the degree to which it has expanded internationally. Surprisingly, even through venture capitalists (VC) are risk specialists, we find that technology - based IPO firms are less likely (i. e. a negative relationship) to have extensive global sales when they are backed by a VC. In support of our reasoned risk - taking theoretical framework, we find that VCs are indeed risk - seeking when VC backing is complemented by the international experience of their board appointees, top management team (TMT) members, or both. IPO firms with significant insider ownership are similarly global risk - seekers, and those effects are strongest with an internationally seasoned board and TMT at the helm.

Opini Anda

Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini!

Kembali