Negotiated Enforcement And Credible Deterrence  

Oleh:

Franzoni, Luigi Alberto

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 109 no. 458 (Oct. 1999), page 509-538.
Fulltext: 509.pdf (347.25KB)

Isi artikel

This paper develops a model of law enforcement in which indicted offenders and the prosecutor can negotiate the penalty prior to the completion of the investigation. The analysis focuses on the credibility of the conviction threat: the prosecutor cannot commit to any predetermined level of investigative effort should the negotiation fail. The settlement stage introduces several new features of the optimal enforcement policy, including the possibility that maximal sanctions may not be optimal. We show that the screening process associated with the negotiation stage reduces the incentives for the prosecutor to undertake thorough investigations and increases the rate of noncompliance.

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