Economic Policy And Special Interest Politics  

Oleh:

Persson, Torsten

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 108 no. 447 (Apr. 1998), page 310-327.
Fulltext: 310.pdf (186.02KB)

Isi artikel

A great deal of research has been done on the boundary between economics and political science in the last five to ten years. This research in political economics' spans many subfields, such as macroeconomics, trade, public finance, regulation, rational choice politics, and game theory. A common denominator has been to study structural models of the political process: agents behave rationally within well-specified economic and political institutions, where the policymaking process is formulated as an extensive form game. Methodologically, much progress has been made relative to traditional approaches, which were often based on inconsistent or irrational political and economic behaviour, relying on non-derived influence functions, political support functions, or vote functions. Yet, the modern work has largely developed separately in each subfield, without much contact with other subfields. And each of the resulting literatures tends to focus on a distinct, but partial, aspect of the political process. In this lecture, I shall argue that even though the progress to date has been substantial, we can gain a better understanding of policymaking in democracies by combining the insights from different strands of thinking.

Opini Anda

Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini!

Kembali