Detail Vote Trading and Information Aggregation (Journal of Finance 62, 2007) Bibliografi Author: Christoffersen, Susan E.K. ; Geczy, Christopher C. ; Musto, David K. ; Reed, Adam V. Topik: Information Aggregation; Voting Rights; Equity Lending; Vote Trading Bahasa: (EN )     Penerbit: Blackwell Publishing     Tempat Terbit: Oxford    Tahun Terbit: 2007     Jenis: Article - diterbitkan di jurnal ilmiah internasional Fulltext: Vote Trading and Information Aggregation.pdf (272.0KB; 0 download) Abstract The standard analysis of corporate governance is that shareholders vote in the ratios that firms choose, such as one-share-one-vote. But if the cost of unbundling and trading votes is sufficiently low, then shareholders vote in the ratios that they themselves choose. We document an active market for votes within the equity-loan market, where we find that the average vote sells for zero. We hypothesize that asymmetric information motivates these vote reallocations, and we find support for this view in the cross section of votes: there is more trade for higherspread firms and more for poor performers, especially when the vote is close. We also find that the vote reallocations correspond to support for shareholder proposals and opposition to management proposals. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Lihat Sejarah Pengadaan  Konversi Metadata   Kembali

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