Detail CEO Compensation and Incentives - Evidence From M&A Bonuses (Journal of Financial Economics 73, 2004) Bibliografi Author: Grinstein, Yaniv ; Hribar, Paul Topik: CEO Compensation; Mergers and acquisitions Bahasa: (EN )     Penerbit: Elsevier     Tempat Terbit: New York    Tahun Terbit: 2004     Jenis: Article - diterbitkan di jurnal ilmiah internasional Fulltext: CEO compensation and incentives Evidence from M&A bonuses.pdf (287.48KB; 17 download) Abstract We investigate CEO compensation for completing M&A deals. We find that CEOs who have more power to influence board decisions receive significantly larger bonuses. We also find a positive relation between bonus compensation and measures of effort, but not between bonus compensation and deal performance. CEOs with more power also tend to engage in larger deals relative to the size of their own firms, and the market responds more negatively to their acquisition announcements. Our evidence is consistent with the argument that managerial power is the primary driver of M&A bonuses. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Lihat Sejarah Pengadaan  Konversi Metadata   Kembali

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