Detail Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives (The Journal of Political Economy, Vol.98, No.2 April 1990) Bibliografi Author: Jensen, Michael C. ; Murphy, Kevin J. Topik: CEO Pay; CEO; Incentives Bahasa: (EN )     Penerbit: The University of Chicago Press     Tempat Terbit: Chicago, Illinois    Tahun Terbit: 1990     Jenis: Article - diterbitkan di jurnal ilmiah internasional Fulltext: Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives.pdf (677.0KB; 3 download) [Informasi yang berkaitan dengan koleksi ini di internet] Abstract Our estimates of the pay-performance relation (including pay, options, stockholdings, and dismissal) for chief executive officers indicate that CEO wealth changes $3.25 for every $1,000 change in shareholder wealth. Although the incentives generated by stock ownership are large relative to pay and dismissal incentives, most CEOs hold trivial fractions of their firm's stock, and ownership levels have declined over the past 50 years. We hypothesize that public and private political forces impose constraints that reduce the pay-performance sensitivity. Declines in both the pay-performance relation and the level of CEO pay since the 1930s are consistent with this hypothesis. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Lihat Sejarah Pengadaan  Konversi Metadata   Kembali

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