Corporate Governance and Risk-Taking  

Oleh:

John, Kose ; Litov, Lubomir ; Yeung, Bernard

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Finance (EBSCO) vol. 63 no. 4 (Aug. 2008), page 1679-1728.
Topik: Corporate; Governance; Risk-Taking
Fulltext: p 1679.pdf (254.54KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ88 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

Lihat Detail Induk

Isi artikel

Better investor protection could lead corporations to undertake riskier but value-enhancing investments. For example, better investor protection mitigates the taking of private benefits leading to excess risk-avoidance. Further, in better investor protection environments, stakeholders like creditors, labor groups, and the government are less effective in reducing corporate risk-taking for their self-interest. However, arguments can also be made for a negative relationship between investor protection and risk-taking. Using a cross-country panel and a U.S.-only sample, we find that corporate risk-taking and firm growth rates are positively related to the quality of investor protection.

Opini Anda

Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini!

Kembali