IPO Pricing and Share Allocation: The Importance of Being Ignorant  

Oleh:

Condat-Larralde, Celine ; James, Kevin R.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Finance (EBSCO) vol. 63 no. 1 (Feb. 2008), page 449-478.
Topik: IPO Pricing; Share Allocation; Importance; Ignorant
Fulltext: p 449.pdf (192.56KB)

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ88 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

Since an underwriter sets an IPO's offer price without knowing its market value, investors can acquire information about its value and avoid overpriced deals ("lemon-dodge"). To mitigate this well-known risk, the bank enters into a repeat game with a coalition of investors who do not lemon-dodge in exchange for on-average underpriced shares. We (i) derive and test a quantitative IPO pricing rule (showing that tech IPOs were not excessively underpriced during the boom of the 1990s); and (ii) analyzing a unique multibank data set, find strong support for the conjecture that a bank preferentially allocates shares to its coalition.

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