Detail Information Sharing in Credit Markets (The Journal of Finance, Vol. 48, No. 5, December 1993) Bibliografi Author: Pagano, Marco ; Jappelli, Tullio Bahasa: (EN )     Penerbit: The American Finance Association     Tempat Terbit: Oxford    Tahun Terbit: 1993     Jenis: Article - diterbitkan di jurnal ilmiah internasional Fulltext: 38.pdf (711.6KB; 1 download) Abstract We present a model with adverse selection where information sharing between lenders arises endogenously. Lenders' incentives to share information about borrowers are positively related to the mobility and heterogeneity of borrowers, to the size of the credit market, and to advances in information technology; such incentives are instead reduced by the fear of competition from potential entrants. In addition, information sharing increases the volume of lending when adverse selection is so severe that safe borrowers drop out of the market. These predictions are supported by international and historical evidence in the context of the consumer credit market. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Lihat Sejarah Pengadaan  Konversi Metadata   Kembali

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