Detail The Value of Commitment with Imperfect Observability and Private Information (The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 30, No. 4, Winter 1999) Bibliografi Author: Maggi, Giovanni Bahasa: (EN )     Penerbit: The Rand Corporations     Tempat Terbit: Santa Monica    Tahun Terbit: 1999     Jenis: Article - diterbitkan di jurnal ilmiah internasional Fulltext: 29.pdf (512.94KB; 0 download) Abstract The idea that commitment is valuable plays a key role in many economic models. However, Bagwell (1995) has shown that commitment may have no value if there is (even a slight) noise in the observation of the leader's action, thus casting doubt on the notion that commitment has strategic value. Here I reconsider the commitment story in a model where the leader's action is imperfectly observed and the leader has private information. I show that the value of commitment is restored by private information, and I examine how it is affected by uncertainty about the leader's type and by the observation noise. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Lihat Sejarah Pengadaan  Konversi Metadata   Kembali

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