Detail Building Corporate Governance in China Draft (This Paper presented at University of Indonesia, for The 4th Asian Law Institute Conference on May 24-25, 2007) Bibliografi Author: Peng, Bing Bahasa: (EN )     Tempat Terbit: Peking    Tahun Terbit: 2007     Jenis: Papers/Makalah - pada seminar internasional Fulltext: PENG Bing.pdf (135.14KB; 1 download) Abstract This essay attempts to claim that establishment of an independent director institution for a seemingly abnormal function in China is a second-good choice under the condition of current ownership structure and the nature of ownership. Because of the concentration of shareholdings under current circumstance, controlling shareholders almost avoid the agency cost derived from managements’ misconducts. Therefore, the key problem in corporate governance in China arises as the controlling shareholders have incentives to “tunneling” the listed companies, damaging the interest of minority shareholders. Because China is a socialism country, most controlling shareholders of Chinese listed companies are governments who are representatives of the state-owned assets. Soft budgetary restraints and local governments’ game playing with central government for their own interests make the prominent problem of corporate governance in China is the “tunneling” listedcompanies by controlling shareholders who are governments, especially local governments. Since traditional legal instruments to control controlling shareholders are incapable of restricting such “tunneling” behaviors of governmental shareholders, the independent director institution became an alternative means to prevent the serious “tunneling” problems. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Lihat Sejarah Pengadaan  Konversi Metadata   Kembali

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