Detail An Analysis of Stock Recommendations   Oleh:  Morgan, John ; Stocken, Phillip C. Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 34 no. 1 (2003), page 183-203. Topik: stock; stock; recommendations Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel We study the information content of stock reports when investors are uncertain about a financial analyst's incentives. Incentives may be aligned, in which case the analyst wishes to credibly convey information, or incentives may be misaligned. We find the following : Any investor uncertainty about incentives makes full revelation of information impossible. Categorical ranking systems, such as those commonly used by brokerages, arise endogenously as equilibria. Under certain conditions, analysts with aligned incentives can credibly convey unfavorable information but can never credibly convey favorable information. Finally, we compare testable implications of the model to empirical properties of stock recommendations. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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