Detail Competition and Incentives With Nonexclusive Contracts   Oleh:  Kahn, Charles M. ; Mookherjee, Dilip Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 29 no. 3 (1998), page 443-465. Topik: competition; competition; incentives; non exclusive contracts Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel We consider a common agency context where socially desired exclusive dealing clauses cannot be enforced. Customers sequentially negotiate nonexclusive credit or insurance contracts from multiple risk - neutral firms in a market with free entry. Each contract is subject to moral hazard arising from a common noncontractible effort decision. Outcomes of a class of Markov equilibria are characterized by a corresponding notion of constrained efficiency. These may involve more rationing than in a context of exclusive contracts. Increases in public provision or competition can result in increased prices on the private market, owing to an induced reduction in customer effort. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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