Satificing Negotiations  

Oleh:

Archibald, James K. ; Hill, Jared C. ; Johnson, Ryan F. ; Striling, Wynn C.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Part C Applications and Reviews vol. 36 no. 1 (Jan. 2006), page 4-18.
Topik: Altruism; Bayesian Networks; Game Theory; Negotiations; Rationality; Satisficing; Sociology

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: II69.2 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

Lihat Detail Induk

Isi artikel

Negotiation procedures that are founded on the doctrine individual rationality, where each participants is committed to maximizing its own satisfaction, are limited in their ability to accommodate the interest of others, and therefore, may unnecessarily constrain the negotioability of a decision maker, particularly in cooperative environments. Satisficing game theory provides a distinct alternative to the hyperationality of conventional rational choice by waiving reliance on the individual rationality premise and offering an approach to negotionary decision making that is based on a well-defined mathematical notion satisficing, or being good enough, that permits the modeling of complex interrelationships between agents. This approach provides a mechanicism to compute the attitude, or degree of conflict or contentedness, of the negotiators. Examples illustrate both single-round and multi around satisficing negation protocols.

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