The Method of Public Morality Versus The Method of Principlism  

Oleh:

Green, Ronald M. ; Gert, Bernard ; Clouser, K. Danner

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy vol. 18 no. 5 (Oct. 1993), page 477-490.
Topik: Descriptivism; Method of Morality; Moral Rules; Principlism; Publicity

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: MM80.1 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Two years ago in two articles in a thematic issue of this journal the three of us engaged in acritique of principlism. In a subsequent issue, B. Andrew Lustig defended aspects of principlism we had criticized and argued against our own account of morality. Our reply to Lustig’s critique is also in two parts, corresponding with his own. Our first part shows how Lustig’s criticisms are seriously misdirected. Our second and philosophically more important part picks up on Lustig’s challenge to us to show that our account of morality is more adequate than principlism. In particular we show that recognition of morality than does principlism. This explains why we adopt the label ”Dartmouth Descriptivism.”

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