Sentiment and Value  

Oleh:

D'Arms, Justin ; Jacobson, Daniel

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 110 no. 4 (Jul. 2000), page 722-248.
Topik: Sentiment; Value; Morality; Humean

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.8 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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When Hume wrote that "Morality... is more properly felt than judged of, "he was getting at something true and important but potentially misleading. Humean sentimentalists need not, and we think should not, be seen as ratifying the edicts of whatever moral feelings one happens to have. Sentimentalism is not an epistemological doctrine; instead, the fundamental claim is metaethical. As Hume puts it,"The final sentence...which pronounces characters or actions amiable or odious, praiseworthy or blameable... depends on some internal sense or feeling which nature has made universal in the whole species. The claim is that evaluation, and in particular moral evaluation, is somehow grounded in human sentiment. "But in order to pave the way for such a sentiment, "Hume continues, "and give a proper discerment of its object, it is often necessary ... that mich reasoning should precede, that nice distinctions be made, just conclusions drawn, distant comparisons formed, complicated relations examined, and general facts fixed and ascertained. Hence, philosophers who take inspiration from Hume must allow reasoning, as well as feeling, to play a role in evaluative judgment. The central challenge for sentimentalism is to preserve the idea that values are somehow grounded in the sentiments, while at the same time making sense of the rational aspects of evaluation.

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