The Moral Significance of Primitive Self-Consciousness: A Response to Bermudez  

Oleh:

Gallagher, Shaun

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 107 no. 1 (Oct. 1996), page 129-140.
Topik: The Moral Significance of Primitive Self-Consciousness: A Response to Bermudez

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.5 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

Various philosophers have denied that infants and very young children are capable of self-consciousness. This seems uncontroversial as long as the concept of self-consciousness is defined in a complex way. Dennett, for example, makes self-consciousness one of six necessary conditions of moral personhood but makes self-consciousness itself depend on the other five conditions. On this definition, self-consciousness involves rationality, an ascribed intentionality, language use, and the possibilities of recognizing and reciprocating with others. Following Frankfurt, Dennett further characterizes self-consciousness as involving second-order volitions, where this means the ability to act upon oneself as if upon another person. It is not surprising, then, that Frankfurt, Dennett, and others deny self-consciousness to young children.

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