Blameless Wrongdoing  

Oleh:

Tannsjo, Torbjorn

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 106 no. 1 (Oct. 1995), page 120-127.
Topik: Blameless Wrongdoing

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.3 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

In his recent book, Moral Reasons, Jonathan Dancy argues that consequentialism cannot successfully account for agent-relativity, that is, the putative moral fact that different moral agents may have different moral goals. For example, an agent may have special obligations toward those who are near and dear to him. A moral agent may feel, with some right, that, although she can help a stranger more, she ought rather to help her own chils slightly less. Dancy's argument takes the from of an attack against what Derek Parfit has said about consequentialism and agent-relativity in Reasons and Persons. In this article I argue against Dancy that, even though there are mistakes in Parfit's argument, his conclusion is correct. Consequentialist does account for, in a plausible way, the phenomenon of agent-relativity.

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