How Children Learn the Meanings of Moral Words: Expressvist Semantics For Children  

Oleh:

Ridge, Michael

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 114 no. 2 (Jan. 2004), page 301-317.
Topik: Augustinian Theories; Discipline; Golden Rule; Children

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.17 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Moral philosophy has long neglected children. This neglect has perhaps become most embarrassingly obvious in certain areas of first-order moral theorizing, but has also left its mark on discussions of moral psychology and metaethics. One facet of this neglect, admirably highlighted by Joshua Gert, is that debates over expressivism have ignored the question of how children could learn the meanings of moral words if expressvism were true. Moreover, this neglect has not been limited to philosophers. If experts in the field are correct, then the question has been neglected by developmental psychologists too: "A particularly interesting domain is the acquisition of moral terms like fair and wrong. An examination of how children learn such words would enlighten us not only about languange development but also about the nature and development of moral thought. But with the exception of a fascinating discussion by Mac Namara (1991), this domain of word learning has been ignored in the developmental literature. Gert argues that the prospects for an account of how children could learn an expressivist semantics for moral words are not encouraging.

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