"Doing and Allowing" and Doing and Allowing  

Oleh:

Bradly, Ben ; Stocker, Michael

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 115 no. 4 (Jul. 2005), page 799-808.
Topik: Reasons; Doing; Scheffler; Arguments; Responbility

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.20 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

In "Doing and Allowing," Samuel Sceffler argues for the following conclusion concerning doing and allowing: "Provided people view themselves as subject to norms of individual responsibility..., they cannot accept at least, assign them greater responsibility for what they do than for what they allow. The heart of his argument is in the following passage: "to see oneself as subject to norms of responsibility is to see oneself as having reason to bring one's conduct into conformity with norms of individual responsibility is itself something one does, and not something that one merely allows to happen. It requires marshaling the full resources of one's agency, including one's capacities for deliberation, choice, and action."

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