Virtues We Can Share: Friendship and Aristotelian Ethical Theory  

Oleh:

Brewer, Talbot

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 115 no. 4 (Jul. 2005), page 721-758.
Topik: Aristotelian Friendship; Evaluative OutLooks; Persahabatan; Cultivation; Virtue

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.20 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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It is sometimes said that because Aristotle conceives of virtues as partial constituents of individual eudaimonia, his thoughts on virtue are radically discontinuous with the concerns the concerns that we moderns call moral (or even ethical). We tend to think it possible for a person to be unimpeachable from a moral (or even ethical). We tend to think that there is a fundamental distinction between reasons arising from our own well-being and reasons arising from morality (or even ethics) and that our moral oblogations sometimes require us to limit or renounce the pursuit of our own good. By contrast, Aristotle's "ethical theory" denies that one could ever secure genuine flourishing or happiness (as eudaimonia is often rendered) by acting otherwise than virtuously. Thus, the thought goes, Aristotle cannot be thought to provide abn account of what we would call moral virtues. Indeed, some contemporary Aristotelians are attracted to the view precisely because it articulates a form of evaluative concern that is fundamentally different from, hence a potential corrective to, the blame- and guilt-centered concerns we moderns compass under the name'morality'

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