The Practical Turn in Ethical Theory Korsgaad's Constructivism, Realism, and the Nature of Normativity  

Oleh:

FitzPatrick, William

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 115 no. 4 (Jul. 2005), page 651-691.
Topik: Ethical; Normativa; Korsgaard's; Critique of Realism; Humanity; Kantian

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.20 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Christine Korsgaard has put forward a sustained critique of ethical realism as part of larger argument for reconceiving the nature of practical philosophy itself. What turns out to be problematic about realism, in her view, is not just familiar set metaphyiscal and epistemological worries other have pressed but very fact that "realism conceives ethics on the model of applied knowledge." This generic feature of realism-whether naturalistic or nonnaturalistic, reductionist or nonreductionist, Platonic or mundane-allegedly embodies a failure to appreciate the deeply practical nature of normativity, making realism incapable of accounting for normative force ethical requirements have for us. The only solution, according to Korsgaard, is to dispense with realism once and for all and to embrace a form of neo-Kantian constructivism that conceives ethics as the "work[ing] out [of] practical solutions to practical problems" in a way that excludes any realist notion that there is " some sort of ethical knowledge that we can apply in action. It is this call a fundamental practical turn in ethical theory that is at the heart of her larger project.

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