Detail On the Sustainability of International Coordination   Oleh:  Espinosa-Vega, Marco A. ; Yip, Chong K. Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW vol. 35 no. 2 (1994), page 383-396. Topik: COORDINATION; international coordination Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: II49 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel The motivation of this paper rests on the attempts by some groups of countries to coordinate their macroeconomic policies. Implicit in these attempts is the notion that coordination by at least some countries is better than zero coordination. We use a dynamic general equilibrium model of international coordination to study the properties of a partial coordination scheme. We find that, indeed, some coordination is Pareto superior to zero coordination. Although a free - riding incentive problem arises in partial coordination schemes, such schemes are sustainable provided the relative size of the coalition is chosen "appropriately." Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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