Heterogeneity and The Incentive to Share Information in Cournot Oligopoly Market  

Oleh:

Hae-Shin, Hwang

Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine
Dalam koleksi: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW vol. 35 no. 2 (1994), page 329-346.
Topik: incentives; heterogeneity; share information; cornout; oligopoly market

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: II49 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

This paper addresses the robustness of information sharing incentives of the Cournot oligopoly firms to differences in the cost functions and the quality of information. Specifically, we investigate : (i) which firm has more incentive to share information, (ii) the conditions under which information sharing is mutually beneficial, and (iii) when it is not mutually beneficial, the conditions under which a firm gains enough to entice the unwilling firm into sharing information by compensation. We show that the firm with a less convex cost function has more incentives to share information, and present conditions for the latter two issues.

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