Promises Under Fire  

Oleh:

Deigh, John

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 112 no. 3 (Apr. 2002), page 483-506.
Topik: Ethics; Thomas Scalon's; Hobbes's;

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.14 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Thomas Scalon’s account of the obligation to keep promise, which he presents in chapter 7 of his book, What We Owe to Each Other, has reinvirorated philosophical debate about the nature and grounds of this obligation. In this chapter’s introduction, Scalon acknowledges the attractiveness of accounts like Hume’s and Rawl’s, on which the existence of social conventions that constitute the practice of promising is essential to generating the obligation to keep a promise. Although he once accepted these account, Scalon no longer thinks yhey provide the best explanation of the wrong that one does when one wrongfully breaks promise. A better explanation, he believes, is provided by an account of the obligation on which it is generated by a principle of duty that does not presuppose the existence of any social convention. My own belief is contrary to Scalon’s Hume’s account, I think, provides the better explanation. In this article I argue for seeing Hume’s account as superior. My argument begins obliquely-and some might think perversely-with sympathetic consideration of Hobbes’s account of promises.

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