Internalist Moral Cognitivism and Listlessness  

Oleh:

Mele, Alfred R

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 106 no. 4 (Jul. 1996), page 727-753.
Topik: Internalist Moral

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.4 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

What role, if any, can moral theory properly play in the project of constructing a theory of motivation? Answering this question is a task for a book, not an article. This article addresses a piece of the puzzle. I will develop a problem for the conjunction of two theses in moral philosophy that jointly imply that moral agents are possessed of motivational attitudes of a certain kind-and, hence, that we ourselves are possessed of such attitudes, on the attractive assumption that we are moral agents. The first thesis is cognitivism about first-person moral ought beliefs-the thesis that such beliefs are attitudes with truth-valued content, and that not all such beliefs are doomed to be false, as they would be if an "error theory" about them were true. The second thesis is a robust internalism about first-person moral ought beliefs-the thesis that, necessarily, any belief that one (oneself) ought, morally, to A constitutes motivation to A. I will argue that the combination of moral cognitivism and this robust internalism places our moral agency at serious risk, and I will extend the argument to a less demanding brand of internalist moral cognitivism. I will not challenge moral cognitivism itself. Granting internalist moral cognitivists their cognitivism, my target is their internalism.

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