Agency and Transaction Cost Perspectives On The Manager-Shareholder Relationship Incentives for Congruent Interests  

Oleh:

Oviatt, Benjamin M.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Academy of Management Review vol. 13 no. 2 (Apr. 1988), page 214-225.
Topik: transaction cost; agency; transaction costs; relationship; incentives; congruent interests
Fulltext: AA11_13_02_Benjamin M. Oviatt.pdf (398.31KB)

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: AA11.1 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

This paper examines the manager - shareholder relationship through agency and transaction cost theories. The literature of those theories suggests several incentives and monitoring methods that may control opportunistic behaviour among managers. Ten hypotheses are proposed concerning those incentives and monitoring methods, and methodological suggestions are made to motivate research regarding the congruence of managerial and shareholder interests.

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