Investments to Create Bargaining Power : The Case of Franchising  

Oleh:

Michael, Steven C.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Strategic Management Journal vol. 21 no. 4 (2000), page 497-514.
Topik: franchising; bargaining power; franchising; entrepreneurship; industry analysis; vertical integration

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: SS30.5 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

Hybrid organizational forms such as franchise systems joint two or more independent parties under a contract. The ability of each party to achive its goals depend upon the relative bargaining power in the relationship established by the contract. Using transaction cost economics and porter's (1980) characterization of sources of bargaining power, this paper argues that the franchisor can make investments in activities such as tapered integration and buyer selection to increase its bargaining power and decrease conflict and litigation in a franchise system. Specifically, tapered integration (owning some units while franchising others), selecting inexperienced franchises, and employing a long training program are predicted to increase the franchisor's bargaining power and the franchise's compliance with franchisor standards. An empirical analysis of litigation in restaurant franchise systems supports the theoretical hypotheses.

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