Detail Essays in game theory Bibliografi Author: Squintani, Francesco ; Dekel, Eddie (Advisor) Topik: ECONOMICS; THEORY Bahasa: (EN )    ISBN: 0-599-79873-4     Penerbit: Northwestern University Press     Tahun Terbit: 2000     Jenis: Theses - Dissertation Fulltext: 9974370.pdf (0.0B; 5 download) Abstract This dissertation explores the impact of some psychology-driven bounded rationality considerations on the theory of games and derives novel conclusions with respect to some models of information economics. The first chapter introduces small probability forgetfulness of actions in games and shows that it may destabilize standard full-memory solutions. Players are repeatedly matched to play a game. After any match, they forget with infinitesimal probability the feasibility of any opponents' unobserved action, and they are reminded of all actions that they observe. During each period, they play an equilibrium consistent with their perception of the game. It is shown that the unique backward induction path drifts into a non-Nash, self-confirming equilibrium, in a class of extensive-form games that are fully characterized. Such a long-run prediction is always Pareto-undominated, and may Pareto dominate the original backward induction path. In one-shot simultaneous-move games, forgetfulness yields a refinement stronger than trembling hand perfection. The second chapter applies the concepts developed in the first chapter to moral hazard with renegotiation. In the standard treatment, second-best contracts are renegotiated. When embedding the principal-agent interaction in a social learning framework which assumes that when renegotiation is not observed, players may forget its feasibility with infinitesimal probability, it is shown that at the unique stable state second-best simple incentive contracts occur with non-negligible positive frequency. The third chapter introduces the issue of self-confidence in the domain of signaling games. While the labor economics literature assumes workers know their own abilities, experimental evidence suggests in the absence of hard facts, subjects are on average overconfident. It is first shown that in any equilibrium of any signaling model, overconfidence cannot make players better off. In a specific signaling model, it is shown that at fully-separating equilibrium, overconfident workers choose tasks that are too onerous, fail them, and, dejected by such a failure, settle down for a position inferior to their potential. Such a pattern leads to permanent underemployment of workers, and inefficiency of the economy. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Lihat Sejarah Pengadaan  Konversi Metadata   Kembali

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