Detail Essays in international corporate governance Bibliografi Author: Shleifer, Andrei (Advisor); Volpin, Paolo Filippo ; Hart, Oliver (Advisor) Topik: ECONOMICS; FINANCE|ECONOMICS; COMMERCE-BUSINESS|POLITICAL SCIENCE; PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION Bahasa: (EN )    ISBN: 0-599-77756-7     Penerbit: Harvard University Press     Tahun Terbit: 2000     Jenis: Theses - Dissertation Fulltext: 9972447.pdf (0.0B; 4 download) Abstract The thesis studies and compares fundamental characteristics of the corporate governance regimes existing in different countries. The first chapter analyzes the interactions between banks and shareholders in closely held companies. A model shows that, if relationship banks extract rents and the party in control enjoys private benefits of control, the number of banks that a company chooses to use is an increasing function of the company's ownership concentration. Evidence on a set of European countries confirms the cross-country prediction of a negative relation between the average number of bank relationships and an index of legal protection for shareholders. A sample of Italian firms supports the within-country prediction of a positive correlation between number of bank relationships and ownership concentration. The second chapter analyzes the determinants of executive turnover in Italian traded companies. Consistent with the hypothesis that pyramidal groups worsen the agency problem between controlling and minority shareholders, it is shown that executive turnover at the bottom of the pyramid does not depend on any measure of performance, and that the sensitivity of turnover to performance decreases as one descends along the pyramid. Moreover, the turnover of members of the controlling family is independent of performance and happens only as a consequence of changes of the firm's control. The last chapter analyzes the political decision that determines the degree of investor protection in one country. It is shown that, in some circumstances, legal rules result from a political agreement between entrepreneurs and workers in which low investor protection is exchanged for high employment protection. The feasibility of this “corporatist” agreement depends on the distribution of wealth and on technological factors. In contrast, “non-corporatist” countries will feature high investor protection and low employment protection. The main prediction, that employment and investor protection are negatively correlated across countries, is consistent with evidence on OECD countries. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Lihat Sejarah Pengadaan  Konversi Metadata   Kembali

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