Detail The causes of the German banking crisis of July 1931 viewed from bank balance sheets and the contemporary financial press Bibliografi Author: Petri, Martin Hans ; Eichengreen, Barry J. (Advisor) Topik: ECONOMICS; HISTORY|HISTORY; EUROPEAN|ECONOMICS; FINANCE Bahasa: (EN )    ISBN: 0-599-22579-3     Penerbit: University of California Press     Tahun Terbit: 1998     Jenis: Theses - Dissertation Fulltext: 9923009.pdf (0.0B; 0 download) Abstract The German banking crisis of July 1931 qualifies as the most serious in German history and one of the severest ever. This dissertation analyses the causes of the crisis. First, it provides a historical overview of the development of the German banking system from the 19th century through the interwar period. Second, it surveys theories of banking crises and examines traditional theories concerning the causes of the German crisis. Third, it analyses the financial press in Germany and the US in the period before the crisis to qualitatively test implications resulting from the traditional interpretations of the crisis. The third chapter concludes that the qualitative evidence supports the interpretation of the crisis as a reparations or exchange rate crisis rather than a banking crisis. The fourth chapter is an empirical study of the causes of financial distress based on the monthly balance sheets of the major public and private banks from 1928 through 1934. The bank-specific data is combined with macroeconomic data in a Cox proportional hazards model to estimate the factors that contributed to bank failure and survival. The results of the empirical study suggest that bank distress was primarily related to withdrawals of mostly foreign deposits and to insufficient liquidity. Asset size, capital adequacy, and universal banking characteristics seem to have had little importance. The results of the macroeconomic variables are inconclusive, possibly as a result of the model specification, with the exception of a negative impact of changes in stock prices. The empirical evidence is consistent with the interpretation of the crisis as a reparations and exchange rate crisis which affected mostly banks with insufficient liquidity—not necessarily insolvent banks. The final chapter discusses the options that were available to policy makers at the time in order to avoid the crisis. It concludes that the political and economic leaders of Germany could possibly have prevented the crisis or reduced its impact if they had acted decisively while the crisis was in its origins instead of reacting passively to the events. However, given the political climate of the interwar period, the options available to policy makers were limited. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Lihat Sejarah Pengadaan  Konversi Metadata   Kembali

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