Detail Three essays on banking Bibliografi Author: Shleifer, Andrei (Advisor); Sapienza, Paola Topik: ECONOMICS; FINANCE|BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION; BANKING Bahasa: (EN )    ISBN: 0-591-85607-7     Penerbit: Harvard University Press     Tahun Terbit: 1998     Jenis: Theses - Dissertation Fulltext: 9832487.pdf (0.0B; 0 download) Abstract This thesis concerns the role of banks in the economy. Chapter I studies the consequences of banking consolidation on banks' credit policies, using a dataset on individual loan contracts. The essay shows that small in-market mergers are beneficial to borrowers. However, as the local market share of the acquired bank increases, the efficiency effect is offset by market power. Banking consolidation also affects borrowers turnover. Small borrowers of target banks are less likely to borrow in the future from the consolidated bank than borrowers of similar banks not involved in mergers. The decision to deny credit to small borrowers does not seem to be based on the quality of the borrower. Chapter II studies the objective function of state-owned banks. This essay compares the interest rate charged to two sets of companies with identical characteristics borrowing from state-owned and privately-owned banks. The results show that state-owned banks charge lower interest rates than privately-owned banks to similar or identical firms. State-owned banks mostly favor firms located in depressed areas. These results remains true even if the company is able to borrow from privately-owned banks, inconsistent with the view that state-owned banks cure market failures. The different behavior of central government banks and local government banks in pricing loans is consistent with the fact that these banks are subject to different political pressures. Chapter III shows that the allocation of debt across creditors, can be explained within a model in which lenders may require too much information, even when borrowers' actions are taken efficiently. If there is competition among lenders, returns from monitoring are different between borrowers and lenders. Thus, lenders do not internalize the total value of the project, but they do bear the entire costs of financing it. So the lender has the incentive to monitor even when it is not in the interest of the entrepreneur. To correct the lenders' incentive, the entrepreneur may disperse his loans across multiple lenders. The optimal degree of debt dispersion depends on firms' quality, and on the pattern through which uncertainty is resolved over time. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Lihat Sejarah Pengadaan  Konversi Metadata   Kembali

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