Optimal Design of Consumer Contests  

Oleh:

Whinston, Andrew B. ; Xianjun, Geng ; Liu, De

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Journal of Marketing (EBSCO) vol. 71 no. 4 (Oct. 2007), page 140-155.
Topik: consumer contests; design

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ94.12 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

Lihat Detail Induk

Isi artikel

A consumer contest is a sales promotion technique that requires participant to apply certain skills as they compete for prizes or awards. This article is the first to employ a game-theoretical approach to investigate consumer contest design issues, including prize structure, segmentation, and handicapping. first, the author find that both skill distribution and the number of contestants play an important role in determining the optimal prize structure in consumer contest. Specifically, if the skill ditribution has the increasing hazard-rate property, it is optimal for a marketer to use a winner-take-all design. In large contest, for the winner-take-all approach to be optimal, it suffices to have increasing hazard-rate property only at the high end of the skill distribution. Second, increasing countest size is beneficial to the marketer. Third, a less dispersive skill distribution leads to higher consumption by consumer at all skill levels and thus is beneficial to the marketer. The marketer may achieve less dispersive skill distribution by (1) segmenting or screening contestant according to their skill levels and (2) adopting a performance evaluating scheme that handicaps high-skilled contestant.

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