Taking A View : Corporate Speculation, Governance and Compensation  

Oleh:

Geczy, Christopher C. ; Minton, Bernadette A. ; Schrand, Catherine M.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Finance (EBSCO) vol. 62 no. 5 (Oct. 2007), page 2405-2444.
Topik: compensation; view; corporate speculation; governance; compensation
Fulltext: p 2405.pdf (516.67KB)

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ88 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

Using responses to a well - known confidential survey, we study corporations' use of derivatives to "take a view" on interest rate and currency movements. Characteristics of speculator suggest that perceived information and cost advantages lead them to take positions actively : that is, they do not speculate to increase risk by "betting the ranch". Specualting firms encourgae mamagers to speculate through incentive - aligning compensation arrangements and bonding contracts and they use derivatives - specific internal controls to manage potential abuse. Finally, we examine whether investors reading public corporate disclosures are able to identify firms that indicate speculating in the confidential survey, they are not.

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